liable for "earthly punishments" (woruldlice steora) for his breach of peace or violation of royal law. Second, he would have to undertake penance for his sins-literally, "spiritual compensation" (godcunde bote)-according to episcopal instruction; if he refused, further "earthly compensation" (woruldbot) would be exacted on Christ's behalf for breaking the rules of the earthly church. This schema takes for granted that two types of justice would be deployed in tandem. Secular authorities would judge an offender for his temporal violation and determine the appropriate punishment or compensation, while ecclesiastical authorities would judge an offender for his sin and determine the appropriate penance. Even though royal power might be used to enforce secular and spiritual law simultaneously, this passage assumes that separate judgments would be issued by lay and religious authorities, each operating within their own jurisdiction.
Wulfstan's understanding of secular and ecclesiastical justice is noteworthy because there is scarce evidence of a division between these systems in the Anglo-Saxon period. Traditional wisdom long held that "there was no sort of distinction between the lay and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction" before the 1066 Norman Conquest. 3 Instead, their separation has been conventionally dated to the reign of William the Conqueror (r. 1066-87), who was purportedly distressed by the fact that English bishops were rendering ecclesiastical judgments in secular courts. To remedy this situation, William decreed:
Nullus episcopus vel archidiaconus de legibus episcopalibus amplius in hundret placita teneant, nec causam que ad regimen animarum pertinet ad iudicium secularium hominum adducant. Sed quicunque secundum episcopales leges de quacumque causa vel culpa interpellatus fuerit ad locum quem ad hoc episcopus elegerit et nominaverit veniat, ibique de causa vel culpa sua respondeat, et non secundum hundret, sed secundum canones et episcopales leges rectum Deo et episcopo suo faciat. . . . Hoc etiam defendo et mea auctoritate interdico, ne ullus vicecomes aut prepositus seu minister regis, nec aliquis laicus homo de legibus que ad episcopum pertinet se intromittat.
[No bishop or archdeacon shall henceforth hold pleas relating to episcopal laws in the [secular] hundred court, nor shall they bring to the judgment of laymen any matter which concerns the rule of souls. But anyone cited under the episcopal laws shall come to the place which the bishop shall choose, and there he shall plead his case, or answer for his offense. He shall not be tried according to the law of the hundred court, but he shall submit to the justice of God and his bishop in accordance with the canons and the episcopal laws. . . . I also forbid any sheriff or reeve or official of the king or any layman to interfere with the laws which pertain to the bishop. 4 ] cil of Lillebonne, for example, affirmed the distinction between these two brands of justice, even as it proclaimed the king's ultimate authority over both. 6 Despite Norman authorities' reforming rhetoric, however, recent scholarship on English legal culture has revealed a more gradual process of adaptation across the eleventh century, with Anglo-Saxon judicial and administrative frameworks providing vital support for post-Conquest initiatives. 7 The fact that Wulfstan differentiated between secular and religious justice in the early 1000s indicates that William's division of English courts was not as novel as it purported to be.
Nevertheless, scholars continue to view William's reign as a turning point for jurisdictional divisions, and indeed, when read backward from the Norman and Angevin periods, Anglo-Saxon royal law appears to make very little distinction between religious and secular justice. 8 Criminal and sinful offenses were frequently addressed together in legislation of the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, and this has been taken to mean that the two were conflated-in the minds of lawmakers, at least-into a broad category of "wrong." 9 Still, there is little dispute that the responsibility to reconcile sinners fell ultimately to the clergy, rather than to secular magnates, since ecclesiastical jurisdiction over sin and its remedies is attested by a range of Anglo-Saxon penitential literature and religious regulations. 10 Yet this material is rarely regarded as evidence for a cohesive system of ecclesiastical justice. On the Continent, religious authorities showed increasing concern with jurisprudence across the tenth and eleventh centuries, delineating ecclesiastical jurisdictions and establishing norms for administering episcopal justice. This trend has not been identified in England during this period, however, presumably because pre-Conquest royal law seems to integrate ecclesiastical and secular interests so closely. 11 Accordingly, while processes of spiritual reconciliation have been well examined in the context of English religious ritual or high-level political activity, scholars have rarely approached them as judicial procedures in their own right. 12 Where Continental bishops employed ecclesiastical law and justice to proclaim their authority in the face of encroaching secular power, their English counterparts are known for their collaboration with laymen. 13 Episcopal participation in lawmaking is evident from the earliest Anglo-Saxon written legislation, which made protection for the church and clergy a priority, and it was not unusual for royal law codes to be drafted by a king's religious advisors. 14 Ecclesiastical councils appear to have become increasingly absorbed into royal assemblies in the ninth century, and tenthcentury legislation refers repeatedly to the will of "the king and his councilors," 11 Sarah Hamilton, "Inquiring into Adultery and Other Wicked Deeds: Episcopal Justice in Tenthand Early Eleventh-Century Italy," Viator 41 (2010): 21-44, identifies a similar lacuna in the historiography of tenth-and eleventh-century ecclesiastical justice in Italy. For examinations of the integration of secular and ecclesiastical interests in Anglo-Saxon law, see Wormald, Making of English Law, esp. 418-29, 449-65; Stefan Jurasinski, The Old English Penitentials and Anglo-Saxon Law (Cambridge, UK, 2015) ; Lisi Oliver, "Royal and Ecclesiastical Law in Seventh-Century Kent," in Early Medieval Studies in Memory of Patrick Wormald, ed. Stephen Baxter, Catherine E. Karkov, Janet L. Nelson, and David Pelteret (Farnham, UK, 2009 ), 97-112; Carole Hough, "Penitential Literature and Secular Law in Anglo-Saxon England," Anglo-Saxon Studies in Archaeology and History 11 (2000): 133-41; Catherine Cubitt, "Bishops and Councils in Late Saxon England: The Intersection of Secular and Ecclesiastical Law," in Recht und Gericht in Kirche und Welt um 900, ed. Wilfried Hartmann and Annette Grabowsky (Munich, 2007) , 151-67; Allen J. Frantzen, The Literature of Penance in Anglo-Saxon England (New Brunswick, NJ, 1983 ), ; Thomas Pollock Oakley, English Penitential Discipline and Anglo-Saxon Law in Their Joint Influence (New York, 1923) . 12 For ecclesiastical ritual, see, for example, Sarah Hamilton, "Rites for Public Penance in Late Anglo-Saxon England," in The Liturgy of the Late Anglo-Saxon Church, ed. Helen Gittos and M. Bradford Bedingfield (London, 2005) 14 An ecclesiastical focus is evident in the laws of Kentish kings AEthelberht (d. c. 616) and Wihtraed (d. 725), as well as in those of the West Saxon king Ine (d. c. 726) . Ecclesiastical authorship of royal law codes or influence over their production is attested throughout the pre-Conquest period: see Oliver, "Royal and Ecclesiastical Law"; Lisi Oliver, The Beginnings of English Law (Toronto, 2002), 14-20, 83-85, and 164-80; Wormald, Making of English Law, esp. 299-300, 310, 330-39, and 449-65. emphasizing the role of bishops in shaping written law. 15 While the line between secular and ecclesiastical offices may have been sharply drawn among participants in these processes, the legal and political activities of religious and lay magnates must have looked very much alike. Moreover, the absence of clearly defined judicial institutions-as well as the shared vocabulary used to describe religious and earthly justice-has obscured how Anglo-Saxon authorities understood the differences between ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions. 16 Although there is now wider agreement among scholars that these spheres were distinguished in some way, there has been little investigation of the precise relationship between them. 17 The following discussion aims to illuminate some pre-Conquest attitudes toward secular and ecclesiastical justice. I will focus predominantly on the writings of Archbishop Wulfstan, with some reference to those of his contemporary, Abbot AElfric of Eynsham (d. c. 1010), with whom he maintained a correspondence. These two ecclesiastics were among the most prolific authors of the later Anglo-Saxon period. Wulfstan was already known as a homilist when he became bishop of London in 996, and he continued to produce sermons after his elevation to the sees of York and Worcester in 1002. It was around this time that he was in contact with AElfric, a homilist and monk of Cerne Abbey and, by 1005, abbot of Eynsham. At Wulfstan's request, AElfric composed a series of Old English and Latin letters synthesizing points of canon law that would be especially pertinent to the work of an archbishop. 18 These letters were copied or adapted in several compilations associated with Wulfstan: they were integrated into his collections of canon law and seem to have inspired sermons and other tracts in his "commonplace book" manuscripts. 19 Wulfstan's man- 15 Cubitt, "Bishops and Councils"; Cubitt, "Individual and Collective Sinning," 59-60, 69-70; Levi Roach, Kingship and Consent in Anglo-Saxon England, 871-978 (Cambridge, UK, 2013) , esp. 104-21. Bishops and other ecclesiastics are explicitly referred to as legislative advisors throughout the tenth and eleventh centuries, as well as in earlier Anglo-Saxon law codes: see Wihtraed prol.; Ine prol.; I AEthelstan prol.; II AEthelstan epilogue; III AEthelstan prol.; VI AEthelstan prol.; I Edmund prol.; II Edmund prol.; III Edmund prol.; V AEthelred prol.; and VI AEthelred prol. The advice of royal councilors in lawmaking is cited in IV AEthelstan 1; V AEthelstan prol. 1; II Edgar prol.; IV Edgar 1; I AEthelred prol.; II AEthelred prol.; III AEthelred prol.; VIII AEthelred prol.; IX AEthelred prol.; X AEthelred 2; Cnut 1018 prol.; I Cnut prol.; II Cnut prol. All laws are cited by their conventional titles and chapter divisions, following Liebermann, Gesetze, above, n. 2; and A. G. Kennedy, "Cnut's Law Code of 1018," Anglo-Saxon England 11 (1982): 57-81. 16 The shared vocabulary for ecclesiastical and secular justice in pre-Conquest England is discussed further below; and see also the discussion of early medieval Latin vocabulary for wrongdoing in Hyams, "Crime and Tort," 109-10, 115. 17 For example, Richard Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1:57, acknowledges that some distinction must have existed between the secular and ecclesiastical spheres; however, when it comes to specific details, "beyond recognizing that the division existed in the minds of the Anglo-Saxons, it may be wiser to remain silent." Compare Barlow, English Church, n. 8); Cowdrey, Lanfranc, AElfric's pastoral letters and their context are discussed by Peter Clemoes, "Supplement to the Introduction," in Bernhard Fehr, Die Hirtenbriefe AElfrics in Altenglischer und Lateinischer Fassung, rev. ed. (Darmstadt, 1966) , cxxvii-cxlviii; Joyce Hill, "Monastic Reform and the Secular Church: AElfric's Pastoral Letters in Context," in England in the Eleventh Century: Proceedings of the 1990 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. Carola Hicks (Stamford, 1992), 103-17; J. E. Cross and Andrew Hamer, eds., Wulfstan's Canon Law Collection (Cambridge, UK, 1999) , 17-22. See further below, n. 44. 19 Wulfstan's so-called commonplace book is a collection of texts-reproduced in different permutations across several manuscripts-compiled by or for Wulfstan, comprised of the archbishop's uscript compilations also included Old English laws, with decrees of earlier Anglo-Saxon kings preserved alongside the archbishop's own legislation, composed between 1008 and 1023 for the West Saxon king AEthelred II (r. 978-1016) and the Danish conqueror Cnut (r. 1016-35) . The religious principles articulated in various "commonplace book" texts informed Wulfstan's approach to royal lawmaking, and it is possible to identify an increasingly cohesive legal ideology-which linked national prosperity to adherence to Christian principles-as his legislative career progressed.
The hazy boundaries between secular and ecclesiastical concerns in Wulfstan's manuscripts, as well as the religious rhetoric that dominates his royal laws, appear to emblematize the all-encompassing approach to justice typically associated with the pre-Conquest period. 20 His dual role as "homilist and statesman" placed him in an ideal position to infuse secular regulation with religious sensibilities. 21 His impulse to align earthly law with divine will emerges clearly in his writings, and the religious priorities in his royal legislation aimed to shape a "holy society" pleasing to God. 22 This does not mean, however, that Wulfstan saw no distinction between royal and religious law, or that he sought to conflate secular and ecclesiastical justice. On the contrary, Wulfstan was clear that religious authorities-especially bishops-held judicial rights and responsibilities distinct from their lay counterparts'. To some extent, this mirrors the approach employed by Wulfstan's contemporaries across the Channel: recent studies of tenth-and eleventh-century Continental canon law compilations reveal an increasing interest in episcopal justice and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, distinct from the secular arm. 23 Although Wulfstan consistently urged cooperation among secular and religious authorities, I propose that he joined his own writings alongside texts by other authors. For the contents and significance of these manuscripts, see especially Dorothy Bethurum, "Archbishop Wulfstan's Commonplace Book," PMLA 57 (1942) Continental counterparts in envisioning a sphere of ecclesiastical jurisdiction independent of secular control.
Jurisdictional Divisions and Royal Law
Wulfstan looked to England's past for models of good law and government. This impulse is clearest in his adaptation of clauses from previous kings' laws in his own codes for AEthelred and Cnut. Yet Wulfstan also regarded earlier legislation as a source for ideological principles whose implementation would restore the nation to its former glory. Accordingly, his reading of England's past legislation was a practical one: what made earlier rulers' laws successful? He provides one answer in his 1014 law code VIII AEthelred, in clause 36: "Wise waeran worldwitan, þe to godcundan rihtlagan woroldlaga settan, folce to steore, ⁊ Criste ⁊ cyninge gerihtan þa bote, þar man swa scolde manega for neode gewildan to rihte" (Wise were those earthly counselors who set earthly laws to divine law, to guide the people, and who adjudged compensation to Christ and the king-by which many people, by necessity, had to submit to justice). 24 This clause articulates a recurring theme in Wulfstan's legislation: that good earthly law must operate in both secular and ecclesiastical spheres, with the best legislators shaping their decrees to conform with divine will. 25 Later, the same law code praises kings AEthelstan (r. 924-39), Edmund (r. 939-46), and Edgar (r. 959-75) for having "God weorðodon ⁊ Godes lage heoldon ⁊ Godes gafel laestan, þa hwile þe hi leofodon" (honored God and held God's law and rendered God's offerings, as long as they lived), and these rulers' incorporation of penitential requirements in their legislation served as a model for Wulfstan. 26 His own assignment of double penalties-"compensation to Christ and the king"-continued this tenth-century tradition by requiring offenders to make amends to both religious and temporal authorities. 27 As clear as this binary division seems, however, Wulfstan's vocabulary in VIII AEthelred 36 blurs the line between secular and ecclesiastical interests. First, the Old English term riht (rendered above as "justice") encompasses a range of possibile meanings, including moral virtue, righteous behavior, and lawful justice. This passage elides these concepts. With double penalties facilitating both religious and secular redemption, riht applies comfortably to both spheres and effaces the boundary between spiritual reha- 24 Wulfstan makes similar points elsewhere in his corpus: see Edward and Guthrum prol. 2 (quoted above, 1 and n. 2) ; Hadbot 11; Grið 24; Dorothy Bethurum, The Homilies of Wulfstan (Oxford, 1957) , 277, no. 21. 25 Wulfstan indicates in other contexts that kings must rely on bishops' advice in order to align earthly legislation with divine law: Gates, "Preaching, Politics, and Episcopal Reform," 115-16. 26 VIII AEthelred 43. Penance was prescribed in royal law with some regularity from the reign of Alfred (r. 871-99), whom Wulfstan acknowledged as a good lawmaker in Edward and Guthrum prol.; for Alfred's introduction of penitential requirements into royal law, see Frantzen, Literature of Penance, . Penance may also have been required in the laws of Wihtraed, promulgated in 696: Oliver, Beginnings of English Law, 154-55, 167-68; Oliver, "Royal and Ecclesiastical Law"; Frantzen, Literature of Penance, 79; but compare Hough, "Penitential Literature and Secular Law," 133-34. For Wulfstan's use of earlier Old English legislation, see Wormald, Making of English Law, 344, See further below, n. 83. bilitation and criminal punishment. 28 Second, bot generally refers to legal compensation in Anglo-Saxon law codes, but it was also the standard Old English term for penance. 29 In this clause, Wulfstan leaves the distinction vague: awarding bot to Christ could mean that earthly fines were to be rendered to the church, but it may also indicate that penance was required by royal law. Finally, Wulfstan recalls that earlier laws were set "folce to steore" (to guide the people). While variants of this phrase are used to describe good leadership in other contemporary texts, in which steore would be rendered "steer" or "guide," Wulfstan often uses steore to denote judicial or otherworldly punishment. 30 In the legislative context of VIII AEthelred, this diction offers the hint of a threat behind the rhetoric of guidance. The note of compulsion in the final phrase-people will be corrected "for neode": "by necessity" or, possibly, "for their own good" or even "by force"-furthers this impression. 31 Although Wulfstan is clear in VIII AEthelred 36 that compensation should ideally encompass both material and spiritual remedies, the inclusion of this sentiment in a royal law code-especially with an intimation of duress-indicates that penalties were to be exacted by secular means. Earthly law (woroldlaga) might be aligned with divine law (godcundan rihtlagan), but it nevertheless remained an instrument of mundane authorities. By this logic, Wulfstan's ideal government would empower the king and his agents to take action against all categories of wrongdoing. The problem was that this ideal was not being met. Whereas past kings had sought to align their laws with God's will, Wulfstan asserts that this approach had been abandoned in recent years, "aefter Eadgares lifdagum" (after Edgar's lifetime). 32 As he explains in VIII AEthelred 38, "And þa man getwaemde þaet aer waes gemaene Criste ⁊ cynincge on worldlicre steore; ⁊ a hit wearð þe wirse for Gode ⁊ for worlde; cume nu to bote, gif hit God wille" (And then was divided that which before was common to Christ and the king in earthly punishment. And ever it became worse before God 28 The various meanings of riht in Old English law are discussed by Daniela Fruscione, "Riht in Earlier Anglo-Saxon Legislation: A Semasiological Approach," Historical Research 86 (2013) 30 For example, AElfric of Eynsham applies the phrase to Moses bringing the Ten Commandments "to steore" mankind-a formulation he uses in his pastoral letters to Wulfstan ("mancynne to steore," "eallum mannum to steore"): AElfric of Eynsham, Letters II.10 and III. 120, ed. Fehr, Hirtenbriefe AElfrics, [74] [75] ; and see further below, n. 44. Wulfstan, by contrast, uses to steore in reference to earthly penalties incurred by religious violations in VI AEthelred 51 and Bethurum, Homilies of Wulfstan, 276, no. 21 ; compare also the later eleventh-century Northumbrian Priests' Law 54.1. Wulfstan also uses steor in reference to divine punishment, corporal punishment for canons, and punishment imposed by earthly (worldlice) authorities: see Bethurum, Homilies of Wulfstan, 254 and 193, nos. 19 and before the world. Let it now come to correction, if God will it). 33 More clearly this time, royal and religious penalties of the past are linked together as "earthly punishment" (worldlicre steore), both to be administered in the secular realm. What, then, did Wulfstan mean by his complaint that a unified (gemaene) mode of earthly justice had been divided? I propose that an answer can be found in the shifting focus and tone of Anglo-Saxon legislation in the second half of the tenth century. Wulfstan noted his admiration for several lawmaking kings in his corpus, but the laws of AEthelred's father, Edgar, best embodied the ideals the archbishop sought to emulate in style, content, and structure. From their opening clauses, Edgar's codes articulate more explicitly than any of his predecessors' the connection between good law and divine favor: royal legislation must be obeyed "Gode to lofe ⁊ ure ealra saula to þearfe ⁊ eallum folce to friðe" (for love of God, and for the necessity of all our souls, and for peace among all the people). 34 The kingdom's prosperity thus requires the enforcement of correct religious practice. Edgar's laws regulate ecclesiastical dues, tithing schedules, observance of feasts and fasts, and protection of churches (ciricgrið), as well as mandating that the population obey the nation's bishops and that laymen ensure that all religious obligations are met. 35 The importance of these rules is further emphasized by the structure of Edgar's extant law codes, which give ecclesiastical clauses their own designated sections. 36 By treating religious guidelines as a subset of secular law, worthy of inclusion in a royal code yet distinct from mundane concerns, Edgar simultaneously assumed responsibility for the well-being of the earthly church and recognized ecclesiastical rules as a self-contained category, distinct from criminal regulation.
Edgar's legislation is also concerned with local procedure, notably in the mandate that lay and ecclesiastical authorities collaborate at shire courts: "þaer beo on ðaere scire biscop ⁊ se ealdorman, ⁊ þaer aegðer taecan ge Godes riht ge woruldriht" (the bishop and the ealdorman of the shire shall be there, and they shall direct both God's justice and earthly justice there). 37 Wulfstan would later require the same approach, 33 Compare the similar formulation quoted above, 1 and n. 2. 34 IV Edgar 15, and compare also II Edgar prol. This command is framed as a response to a divine punishment of plague, which "mid synnum ⁊ mid oferhyrnysse Godes beboda geearnod waere" (was earned with sin and with contempt for God's command): IV Edgar 1. 35 For ecclesiastical dues, see II Edgar 1.1, 2-2.3, 5.2; IV Edgar 1-1.8. For tithing schedules and timely payment, II Edgar 2.3-4; IV Edgar 1.4-1.5. For feasts and fasts, II Edgar 5-5.1. For protection of churches (ciricgrið), II Edgar 5.3. For obedience to bishops, IV Edgar 1.8. For lay enforcment of religious rules, IV Edgar 1.5, 1.8, 15. Many of these obligations were required by Anglo-Saxon royal law before Edgar's: see, for example, Ine 3, 4, 5-5.1, 61; Alfred 2.1, 5, 5.5, 6-6.1, 40.1-2; I AEthelstan; AEthelstan Alms; II AEthelstan 5, 24.1; III AEthelstan 1.1; I Edmund 2, 5; II Edmund 2. 36 Edgar's two-part Andover legislation, II-III Edgar, treated ecclesiastical and secular regulations in separate sections, and there is a comparable division in IV Edgar, with clauses 1-1.8 focused on religious matters and clauses 2-14 focused on earthly matters. However, both texts reveal overlap between spiritual and secular concerns: see Wormald, Making of English Law, 313-20. AEthelstan and Edmund also promulgated self-contained sets of religious mandates in addition to law codes concerned predominantly with secular affairs: see I AEthelstan, AEthelstan Alms, and I Edmund; Cubitt, "Bishops and Councils," 156-57. 37 III Edgar 5.2. This collaborative approach mirrors Carolingian practice, which called for cooperation between lay and ecclesiastical authorities in administering justice and enforcing the law: an overview is provided by Hamilton, "Episcopal Justice," 26-29. For Wulfstan's reliance on Carolingian replicating this clause verbatim in his laws for Cnut. 38 During the early decades of AEthelred's reign, by contrast, Wulfstan claimed that the kingdom had moved away from the type of collaborative justice that characterized Edgar's legislation, with the separation of punishments once "common to Christ and the king" proving detrimental to the kingdom's health. 39 Certainly, the tenor of written law changed after Edgar's death, and this shift may help illuminate Wulfstan's critique. From AEthelred's accession in 978 until Wulfstan began drafting royal legislation in 1008, royal law was dominated by secular matters, without corresponding sections of ecclesiastical rules. 40 In the various instructions concerning local and regional courts issued during these three decades, there was no stated requirement that laymen and clergy administer justice together. This seems to reflect a new legislative strategy, which departed from Edgar's: instead of unifying ecclesiastical and secular justice under the king's authority, AEthelred's pre-Wulfstanian laws decoupled religious regulations from royal law. 41 In this context, Wulfstan's concerns about the division of punishments should not be read as an abstract complaint but as a direct response to recent legal developments. The exhortation in VIII AEthelred 38 that this situation "cume nu to bote" (come now to correction) indicates that Wulfstan was calling for specific practices to be remedied.
So what motivated these changes? Edgar's integrated approach to law and justice was likely informed by the ideology of the tenth-century monastic reforms, which fostered close collaboration between the king and high-ranking ecclesiastics. 42 After Edgar's death, England's political landscape became more complicated. A protracted succession debate between Edgar's young sons, conflicts among the nobility, and the resumption of Viking attacks in England moved the nation away from the unifying ideals of the previous regime. Where contemporary accounts of Edgar's reign (composed predominantly by reforming ecclesiastics) praised the king's engagement with religious institutions, the next generation of authors proved more wary of lay involvement in church affairs. 43 Their anxiety about the corrupting influence of the secular world extended to the administration of justice. Most prominently, AElfric of sources and models, see, for example, Patrick Wormald, "Archbishop Wulfstan: Eleventh-Century State Builder," in Townend, Wulfstan, Archbishop of York, 9-27; Joyce Hill, "Archbishop Wulfstan: Reformer?," in Townend, Wulfstan, Archbishop of York, 309-24; Christopher A. Jones, "Wulfstan's Liturgical Interests," in Townend, Wulfstan, Archbishop of York, 325-52. 38 II Cnut 18.1. For councils comprised of lay and ecclesiastical authorities, see Cubitt, "Bishops and Councils," 154-59; Elliot, "Canon Law Collections," 45-49; Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 123. Compare also Anglo-Saxon synods classified as concilia mixta, in which ecclesiastical matters were considered under royal oversight: see Catherine Cubitt, Anglo-Saxon Church Councils c. 650-c. 850 (London, 1995), 6-8, 44-59; Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1:14-19. 39 VIII AEthelred 38; see above, n. 33. 40 As Wormald, Making of English Law, 328, notes, AEthelred's early laws were "as resolutely secular as Wulfstan's were overwhelmingly ecclesiastical." 41 Given the length and thoroughness of these texts, this secular focus seems to be an intentional strategy and not the result of careless omission. In Wormald's words, "English legislation had seldom before been so thoroughly planned": Wormald, Making of English Law, 325. 42 I argue this point at greater length in "King Edgar and the Laws of Archbishop Wulfstan," in Remembering the Present: Generative Uses of the Anglo-Saxon Past, ed. Jay Paul Gates and Brian O'Camb (Leiden, forthcoming). 43 Marafioti, "Edgar and the Laws of Wulfstan." For the increasing influence of high-ranking laity in ecclesiastical affairs, see Cubitt, "Individual and Collective Sinning, [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] Eynsham cautioned strongly against the clergy's participation in secular courts, and it is significant that his fullest discussions of this matter appear in the pastoral letters he wrote for Wulfstan. 44 One of AElfric's concerns was that criminal trials-like any other earthly activity-distracted clergymen from completing their spiritual work as pastors. 45 The greater problem, though, was that "illa manus quę humanum sanguinem effuderit non potest digne domini calicem sanctificare" (the hand that spills human blood cannot worthily sanctify the chalice of the Lord). 46 Because bloodshed was a fundamental element of earthly justice, clergy were prohibited from rendering secular judgments: "We ne moton beon ymbe mannes deað. Þeah he manslaga beo oþþe morðfremmende oþþe mycel þeofman, swaþeah we ne scylan him deað getaecean. Na we ne motan deman ymbe þaet" (We may not be involved in the death of a man. Even if he is a killer or a murderer or a great thief, nevertheless, we must not prescribe death for him. We may never make a judgment concerning that). 47 Instead, "seculares iudices debent iudicare de furibus et latronibus, quia canones prohibent episcopos uel clericos de his iudicare" (secular judges ought to judge concerning thieves and robbers, because the canons prohibit bishops or clerics to judge concerning them). 48 AElfric did not object to the application of physical punishments per se, but he feared that clerical participation would degrade the purity of the church. 49 AElfric's concerns were not unfounded, for there is ample evidence around the turn of the millennium that high-ranking clergy rendered judgment in secular 44 AElfric composed these texts after Wulfstan's elevation to York in 1002. The Old English and 45 "Sed ualde dolendum est, quia his diebus tanta neglegentia est in episcopis qui deberent esse columpne aecclesiae, ut non adtendant diuinam scripturam nec docent discipulos qui sibi succedant in episcopatum . . . sed honores seculares et cupiditates uel auaritiam sectantes plus quam laici mala exempla subditis prebentes" (For it is truly to be regretted, that in these days there is such negligence among the bishops, who ought to be pillars of the Church, that they do not pay attention to divine scripture nor teach students who will succeed them in the episcopacy . . . but are following secular honors and desires or avarice more than the laity do, presenting a bad example to their underlings): AElfric of Eynsham, Letter 2a.15, ed. Fehr, Hirtenbriefe AElfrics, 226-27. This passage appears toward the end of a discussion on clerical participation in secular justice; see further below. 46 cases. 50 Latin hagiographies of the later tenth century recalled that Archbishop Dunstan of Canterbury ordered the amputation of forgers' hands and Bishop AElfheah of Winchester sentenced a thief to flogging; both actions were described as the just enforcement of the law. 51 In the same period, there are records of abbots pronouncing outlawry, which offenders could avoid through material payments. 52 Bishop Oscytel of Dorchester was reportedly ready to pronounce a death sentence for a thieving priest, had the offender's friends not secured a lesser sentence through a generous gift to his church. 53 Other accounts attest that clergy deliberated with secular magnates to issue sentences for material offenses. Archbishop Dunstan, Bishop AEthelwold of Winchester, and two other bishops were named as participants in a royal council that ruled a thief's property forfeit; 54 and in 996, two archbishops, six bishops, and seven abbots participated in a council that pronounced a recalcitrant nobleman's life and property forfeit. 55 Although proceedings like these may have been in line with the collaborative approach advocated in Edgar's laws, there appears to have been a reaction against this level of clerical participation in secular affairs by the later tenth century. As AElfric noted in his pastoral letter, "qui uero iudex aut occisor latronum est, non potest inter agnos innocentes computari" (whoever is a judge or killer of thieves cannot be 50 Barlow, English Church, . 51 A comparable construction, which probably indicates another abbatial sentence of outlawry, notes that one Osgot transferred an estate to Abbot Ealdulf, "þe he geald him for þam utlage þe he Styrcyr ofslogh" (which he paid over to him for the outlawry he had incurred through slaying Styrcyr); Robertson, Charters, [76] [77] [78] [79] no. 40 . This text should be dated between 963 and 992: see Robertson, Charters, 330; Wormald, "Handlist, " 262, The other possible outcome was that the thief would be ejected from his order, but it seems that neither of these sentences was enacted. The episode is recorded in the Liber Eliensis, where it is dated to the reign of Edgar: see E. O. Blake, ed., Lieber Eliensis (London, 1962), 106; Janet Fairweather, trans., Liber Eliensis: A History of the Isle of Ely from the Seventh Century to the Twelfth (Woodbridge, UK, 2005), 129; Wormald, "Handlist, " 267, no. 124. 54 The episode occurred during the reign of Edgar but was recorded between 975 and 987: Robertson, Charters, 123, no. 59; see also Wormald, "Handlist, " 262, no. 45 . This charter is catalogued in P. H. Sawyer, Anglo-Saxon Charters: An Annotated List and Bibliography (London, 1968), no. 1457 (henceforth cited as S1457).
55 "Þa getaehton ealle þaet witan þe þaer waeron ge gehadode ge laewide þam cynge ealle Wulboldes aere 7 hine silfne to þam þe se cynge wolde swa to life swa to deaþe" (Then all the witan who were present-both clergy and lay-assigned to the king all of Wulfbold's property as well as his life, so that the king would decide if he should live or go to his death); Robertson, Charters, 129, no. 63; Wormald, "Handlist," 262-63, nos. 57-58; S877. The text goes on to list the individuals who participated in this decision ("þis sind þa men þa waeron aet þa tacinge") and record the subsequent decision against Wulfbold's widow and son.
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Speculum 94/3 (July 2019) numbered among the innocent lambs). 56 Attitudes like his must have inspired a greater separation of secular and ecclesiastical justice in order to promote an ideal of clerical purity, and I suggest that views of this sort motivated the drafters of AEthelred's pre-Wulfstanian law codes to focus exclusively on earthly offense and regulation. 57 Moreover, if the secular bent of written legislation was accompanied by changes in judicial administration, it is reasonable to hypothesize that religious offenses were removed from the jurisdiction of shire courts and addressed instead through a separate process of ecclesiastical justice, overseen by clergy and governed by canon law rather than royal decrees-a model consistent with contemporary Continental practice and with post-Conquest approaches to justice. 58 The logistics of such a bifurcated system will be considered further below. For the present discussion, though, Wulfstan's objections to the division of religious and secular penalties in VIII AEthelred 36-38 make clearer sense if clergy and laymen had begun administering justice independently, instead of at a common gathering. Such a scenario would also help explain why Wulfstan considered Edgar's legislation to be so valuable: it provided a blueprint for judicial collaboration between laymen and ecclesiastics. The success of Edgar's reign proved that his collaborative model was effective and in line with God's will. Accordingly, Wulfstan built on the content and structure of Edgar's laws in his efforts to restore this lost status quo ante. 59 In 1008, he reintroduced religious rhetoric and regulations into royal legislation with V-VI AEthelred; in 1014, he codified his admiration for earlier kings' alignment of secular and divine justice with VIII AEthelred; and in the 1020s, he revived judicial collaboration as a legal requirement in I-II Cnut. 60 Wulfstan's ideal was a law that gave religious and secular priorities equal weight, keeping spiritual and earthly order by compelling offenders to submit both to ecclesiastical and temporal justice. Still, it is important to note that this unified approach was not automatic or inevitable. Neither should it be attributed to an inability or disinclination to differentiate religious from secular wrongdoing. AElfric advocated that clear boundaries between the mundane and religious spheres be maintained, and the secular focus of AEthelred's pre-Wulfstanian legislation indicates that this approach was considered valid by high-ranking royal advisors. Based on the passages quoted above, it is clear that Wulfstan also recognized secular and ecclesiastical justice as distinct, separable processes. However, he appears to have been en-56 AElfric of Eynsham, Letter 2a.15, ed. Fehr, Hirtenbriefe AElfrics, 226. 57 Simon Keynes has identified a shift in AEthelred's advisors in the early 990s: a greater ecclesiastical presence in witness lists coincided with a rise in grants of lands and privileges to religious institutions. During this period, a number of royal grants framed the restoration of lands and privileges in penitential terms, with AEthelred expressing contrition for earlier abuses against the church at the advice of bad advisors; it is conceivable that religious institutions were given a new degree of autonomy from secular authorities. For AEthelred's advisors and grants during this period, see especially Simon Keynes, The Diplomas of King AEthelred "the Unready," 978-1016 (Cambridge, UK, 1980), 176-202; compare also Wormald, Making of English Law, 323, for the influence of the royal advisors on AEthelred's pre-Wulfstanian law. For the penitential considerations behind these royal grants, see Cubitt, "Politics of Remorse"; Roach, "Public Rites," 193-99. 58 Above, n. 23. 59 gaging in a broader debate over the appropriate relationship between earthly and religious law. In support of his own position, Wulfstan promulgated the historical narrative that underpinned his laws: secular and ecclesiastical justice had been united under Edgar (and other good kings of the past) and divided after Edgar's death, to the detriment of the kingdom. The surest way to restore God's favor, by this logic, was to revive the methods of government that had brought prosperity to previous generations. The question, then, was how to unite ecclesiastical and secular processes while maintaining the integrity of each-preserving the purity of the clergy, for instance, while ensuring that earthly punishment remained effective. 61 What was the appropriate relationship between ecclesiastical and secular justice?
Judicial Jurisdictions in De medicamento animarum and Old English Law
Wulfstan provides a detailed discussion of the relation between secular and ecclesiastical authority in a short Latin tract, De medicamento animarum, which is preserved in one of his "commonplace book" manuscripts. 62 The piece opens with an overview of bishops' duties, including their obligation to impose penance; it then prohibits laymen from participating in ecclesiastical judgments and clergy from participating in secular judgments; and it concludes with an exhortation to all the faithful to submit to Christian teaching. Throughout the text, discussions of penance, teaching, and episcopal responsibility are framed in judicial terms, with markedly legalistic vocabulary. In particular, Wulfstan is concerned with ecclesiastical judgments (iudicia ęclęsiastica), differentiating these firmly from secular judgments (secularibus iudiciis) and explaining that episcopal judges held powers distinct from those of their secular counterparts. 63 At first glance, Wulfstan's position here seems antithetical to the collaborative approach he advocates in VIII AEthelred, for De medicamento animarum states clearly that "episcoporum enim est omnia iudicia ęclęsiastica rite disponere" (it is right that bishops set all ecclesiastical judgments). 64 The text continues: 61 [Also, let bishops by no means importunely occupy themselves with administration or pleas in secular judgments or lawsuits-only with ecclesiastical ones. Thus they may be free for readings and orations and zealously preaching the word of God. For the Apostle said: let no soldier of God involve himself in secular business. 66 For just as there is distance between the orders, so also there ought to be distance between priestly and secular judgments, and let no one presume to usurp for himself what is not suitable for his order.]
The delineation of episcopal duties is a familiar element of Wulfstan's writings, as are calls for the clergy to devote themselves zealously to their religious obligations. 67 This excerpt also echoes AElfric's concerns that involvement in secular justice would distract and corrupt the clergy. 68 Unlike AElfric, however, Wulfstan does not ground his discussion in moral admonitions or prohibitions against bloodshed. 69 In fact, this passage focuses less on the spiritual implications of secular involvement than on the distinction (distantia) between different types of judgments (iudicis) and pleas or cases (causis), as well as the different groups responsible for overseeing them. 70 Here, Wulfstan draws a clear line: bishops are required to issue ecclesiastical judgments and forbidden to issue earthly ones.
De medicamento animarum also places jurisdictional limits on secular authorities, firmly restricting the king and other laymen from intervening in ecclesiastical justice. 71 First, Wulfstan asserts that "laicorum autem non est sed sacerdotum dei: de ęclęsiastices disputare iudiciis" (it is not for the laity but for the priests of God to deliberate ecclesiastical judgments). 72 He then lists a series of biblical and patristic examples to support this point, concluding with the following comments:
His exemplis declaratur . ualde perniciosum esse regi uel principi: uel alicui ex laico ordine disputare aut tractare de eclesiasticis iudiciis siue canonicis causis. . . . Alexander quoque ad demetrium regem ait; Numquam auditum uel ab aliquo factum sit: ut presentibus episcopis laici disputent de canonicis uel aliis eclesiasticis ca[u]sis: sed omnium eclesiasticarum rerum . episcopi curam habeant . et ea uelut deo contemplante dispensent. 73 [By these examples, it is shown to be truly pernicious for the king or prince or anyone from the laity to argue or negotiate ecclesiastical judgments or canonical lawsuits. . . . Alexander also said to King Demetrius: may it never be heard of or done by anyone that-with bishops present-the laity should dispute concerning canonical or other ecclesiastical lawsuits; but let bishops have care of all ecclesiastical affairs and let them manage them as if God were observing.]
Wulfstan draws a sharp distinction between religious and secular justice in this tract, restricting the personnel authorized to participate in each-an approach that anticipates, to some extent, the post-Conquest division of criminal and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. In an early eleventh-century context, however, Wulfstan seems to be following AElfric in correcting the clergy's overenthusiastic participation in secular procedures. By advocating for strict boundaries in judicial administration, Wulfstan is responding to the very problems AEthelred's early laws-which separated secular from eccclesiastical procedure-appear to address. Still, the system Wulfstan describes in De medicamento animarum does not fit a strict binary model of secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. He identifies two separate strands of religious justice in this passage, twice distinguishing ecclesiastical (eclesiasticis) from canonical (canonicis) lawsuits. 74 There is no explanation of how these types of suits differ, and it is conceivable that the terms were employed synonymously in this text, for rhetorical emphasis. 75 Alternatively, it is possible that these terms reflect precise legal categories-and that Wulfstan understood transgression somewhat differently than his later medieval counterparts, who construed ecclesiastical and criminal justice as opposing, mutually exclusive categories. Certainly, Wulfstan advocated for separate judicial responses to religious and secular offenses. Yet he also recognized an opposition between material wrongdoing, which caused harm to earthly institutions and required material compensation to make those institutions whole, and spiritual wrongdoing, which offended God and required penitential compensation to redeem offenders' souls.
This distinction is articulated in the opening passage of De medicamento animarum, as part of a discussion of the clergy's major responsibilities. The tract begins with the following assertion: "Episcopi igitur et presbiteri pre omnibus sint semper solliciti de cura ęclesiarum . et de medicamento animarum" (Bishops, therefore, and priests should always, above everything, be concerned with the care of churches and with the medicine of souls). 76 The clergy's twofold charge-to care for individual 73 Elliot, "Canon Law Collections," 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe AElfrics, 251-52. 74 Above, n. 73. 75 For this type of parallelism in Wulfstan's corpus, see Don W. Chapman, "Germanic Tradition and Latin Learning in Wulfstan's Echoic Compounds," Journal of English and Germanic Philology 101 (2002): 1-18, esp. 11-12. 76 Elliot, "Canon Law Collections," 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe AElfrics, 251. The clause on the care of churches ("de cura ęclesiarum . et") was added in the margin in Wulfstan's hand: see Ker, "Handwriting of Archbishop Wulfstan, " 324. churches and to care for Christian souls-requires them to take responsibility both for earthly institutions and spiritual affairs. This dual obligation is reiterated a few lines later: "Status christianę religionis et ęclęsiasticę dignitatis ad eorum curam maxime pertinet" (The state of the Christian religion and the state of the church's dignity rely entirely upon their [i.e., the clergy's] care). 77 Wulfstan distinguishes here between cultivating faith and cultivating the church, again differentiating spiritual from material concerns within the religious sphere. I propose that this spiritualmaterial conceptualization explains Wulfstan's repeated reference to ecclesiastical (eclesiasticis) and canonical (canonicis) suits. According to this schema, ecclesiastical suits would be those which dealt with violations against the rights and property of the earthly church (ęclęsiasticę dignitatis), to be compensated with material penalties-such as fines paid to the bishop-in accordance with earthly law. Canonical suits, by contrast, would be those which concerned sinful violations against God, to be remedied with penance prescribed in accordance with canon law. 78 Wulfstan's royal legislation supports this interpretation and indicates that his approach to lawmaking was informed predominently by a spiritual-material opposition, rather than an ecclesiastical-criminal one. For example, VIII AEthelred 2-3 sets the following compensation for anyone who commits homicide in a church:
And þaet is þonne aerest, þaet he his agenne wer Christe ⁊ þam cyninge gesylle ⁊ mid þam hine sylfne inlagie to bote. . . . Þonne bete man þaet cyricgrið into ðaere cyrcan be cynges fullan mundbrice ⁊ þa mynsterclaensunge begyte, swa ðerto gebirige, ⁊ aegþer ge maegbote ge manbote fullice gebete ⁊ wið God huru þingie georne. 79 [First, that he pay his own wergild to the king and to Christ, and thereby place himself within the law, so that he might offer compensation. . . . Then, for violating the church peace, let him pay that church the full fine for breaking the king's peace; and let him take responsibility for the church cleaning, as is appropriate; and let the offender fully compensate the family and lord of the dead man; and let him above all eagerly settle with God.] In this case, the killer is required to pay monetary fines "to the king and to Christ," render material compensation to the violated church and his victim's survivors, and settle (þingie) with God directly. The payments to the king and survivors serve to compensate the violation of royal protection and the injury done to the dead man, both attested responses to homicide in Anglo-Saxon legislation. The remaining penalties are concerned with the fact that the killing took place in a church. The wergild payment to Christ and the fine rendered to the violated church should be under- 77 Elliot, "Canon Law Collections," 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe AElfrics, 251. 78 This distinction anticipates the language of William's writ, which distinguishes "canones et episcopales leges" (canon and episcopal laws); see above, n. 4, and also below, n. 87, for Wulfstan's use of the term canon. These categories are not always differentiated: in describing various types of penance at the beginning of De medicamento animarum, for example, Wulfstan implies that these are all issued by a bishop's "iudicia ęclęsiastica" (ecclesiastical judgments). Compare a rather different distinction between canon and ecclesiastical law in later periods: "canon law denotes in particular the law of the 'Corpus Juris,' including the regulations borrowed from Roman law; whereas ecclesiastical law refers to all laws made by the ecclesiastical authorities as such, including those made after the compiling of the 'Corpus Juris'": Auguste Boudinhon, "Canon Law," The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 9 (New York, 1910) , http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09056a.htm (last accessed 31 October 2017). 79 VIII AEthelred 2-3 (5 I Cnut 2.3-5).
stood as material restoration for injury to the earthly institution: the former would redeem the violation of Christ's protection, and the latter would redeem the violation of consecrated space. 80 Accordingly, both payments are governed by earthly law, which establishes the correct amounts required for each element of material harm-just as payments are calculated for the king and for the victim's survivors. By contrast, settlement with God would be achieved through an act of penance, which would redeem the sin incurred by the killer's actions. 81 Nevertheless, although penance is mandated by royal law, no precise action is specified here. Unlike material offenses to earthly entities, which were regulated and punished in the secular sphere, penance was rendered to God through the mediation of an ordained confessor; its particulars were therefore outside the purview of royal regulation. VIII AEthelred 2-3 offer some of the most detailed instructions in Wulfstan's legislation and thus allow different categories of offense to be clearly distinguished. These clauses are exceptional, though, for Wulfstan's laws rarely address different genres of punishment so precisely. Even though he distinguishes ecclesiastical (eclesiasticis) from canonical (canonicis) suits in De medicamento animorum, these categories are obscured in his vernacular legislation: there is no corresponding Old English vocabulary for different forms of religious justice. 82 However, Wulfstan makes a broader distinction between categories of offense in his repeated injunction that wrongdoing be remedied in both spheres, using the phrase for Gode ⁊ for worolde. 83 In standard translations of the Old English, this phrase is rendered "in matters both religious and secular," suggesting an opposition between criminal and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. 84 However, in the context of the present discussion, 80 The wergild payment to Christ might be rendered to the violated church, but it is also likely that this fine would be collected by the bishop, acting in Christ's stead. The appropriate use of such payments is outlined in VI AEthelred 51, discussed below, n. 128. 81 Bosworth-Toller, s.v. "þingian," section 2, glosses þingian as "to make terms, settle." Wulfstan repeatedly uses the term in penitential contexts, in which individuals are urged to settle or make amends with God for their sins. Sometimes the act of settling with God (wið God þingian) is part of a larger process of turning from sin: Bethurum, Homilies of Wulfstan, 275, no. 20 [ei] ; Napier, Wulfstan, 130 and 204, nos. xxvii and xlii. Elsewhere, the clergy is instructed to intervene (þingian) with God to settle a penitent's sins at the end of Lent or during a penitential fast: Bethurum, Homilies of Wulfstan, 235, no. 14; Napier, Wulfstan, 171, no. xxxv . In other texts, individuals are exhorted to settle with God directly as part of good Christian practice or as a condition of absolution: Cnut 1020 19; Roger Fowler, "A Late Old English Handbook for the Use of a Confessor," Anglia 83 (1965) , 1925), 1:79, 81, 89, 103, 195 . Dorothy Whitelock translates "in both religious and secular concerns" (V AEthelred 1, with similar phrasing at 4, 33.1), "in Church and state" (VIII AEthelred 38), "to God
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Speculum 94/3 (July 2019) a more accurate rendering would be "to God and to earthly authorities," reflecting a spiritual-material division. This reading is borne out in descriptions of how different compensation for Gode ⁊ for worolde ought to be determined. For instance, VI AEthelred 50 decrees: "Se þe ahwar heonan forð rihte laga wyrde, Godes oþþon manna, gebete hit georne, swa hwaeþer swa hit gebyrige, swa mid godcundre bote swa mid woroldcundre steore" (Henceforth, whoever violates the rightful law of God or men anywhere: let him eagerly make amends in whatever way is fitting, whether with penance or with earthly punishment). 85 In this formulation, violation of God's law requires spiritual compensation (godcundre bote), while violation of human law requires earthly punishment (woroldcundre steore). This clause does not distinguish civil from ecclesiastical penalties; instead, it differentiates penance rendered to God from material punishment rendered to earthly powers. This point is addressed in greater detail in II Cnut 38.2, which explains exactly how compensation should be determined in each sphere: "godcunde bote sece mann symle georne be boctaecinge, ⁊ woruldcunde bote sece man be woruldlage" (let spiritual compensation [i.e., penance] always be undertaken eagerly, according to book teachings, and let earthly compensation be undertaken according to earthly law). 86 This clause again divides penance (godcunde bote) and earthly compensation (woruldcunde bote) into opposing categories, but it goes a step further than VI AEthelred 50 by codifying the guiding principles behind each. Where earthly compensation is to be determined by earthly law (woruldlage), penance is governed by "book teachings" (boctaecinge), or canon law. 87 Wulfstan is clear that separate processes must be used to determine and implement these two types of penalties, but in articulating this logic, he grants sins a distinctive status: they merit prohibition under secular law, but they can only be remedied through ecclesiastical procedure.
Material violations against the church, by contrast, were given precise punishments in Wulfstan's royal laws: such offenses required earthly compensation (woruldcunde bote) governed by earthly law (woruldlage) in order to maintain the health of an earthly institution. This was the case in VIII AEthelred 2-3, which required an individual who committed homicide in a church to render payment for violating Christ's protection and bear the cost of cleaning the defiled building. 88 Wulfstan assigned monetary payments to bishops in his royal legislation, as well. If episcopal protection (borh) was violated, for instance, bishops were granted compensation and to men" (II Cnut 38.1): see Whitelock, English Historical Documents, vol. 1, c. 500-1042, 2nd ed. (London, 1979), 442-46, 451, and 460, nos. 44, 46, and 49. 85 The phrase godcundre bot refers to penance elsewhere in Wulfstan's corpus, notably V AEthelred 29; Edward and Guthrum prol. 2; Hadbot 2-8; Napier, Wulfstan, 275, no. li payments comparable to those awarded to high-ranking laymen. 89 Fines for committing perjury under oath, attacking a clergyman, and failing to pay ecclesiastical dues were to be split between the local lord and bishop; moreover, anyone who wounded another while resisting tithe collectors was to render an additional fine to the king and pay the bishop to reedeem his hand from amputation. 90 In these cases, bishops were construed as injured parties entitled to recompense under royal law, just like their lay counterparts. Elsewhere in his royal law codes, Wulfstan decrees that specific offenses be subject to episcopal rather than secular judgment. 91 This was the case in instances in which clergy committed offenses normally governed by secular law: a clergyman (gehadod man) who committed a capital crime was to be captured and "healde to bisceopes dome" (held for the bishop's judgment); a priest (maessepreost) who gave false witness, perjured himself, or was an accomplice to thieves was to be removed from his office "buton he wið God ⁊ wið men þe deoplicor gebete, fullice swa biscop him taece" (unless he compensate deeply to God and to men, entirely as the bishop instructs him). 92 Similar instructions were given concerning laypeople who failed to refute charges of sexual misconduct or illicit killing (morð). If a married man kept a concubine, he was to be excluded from communion until he compensated "swa bisceop him taece" (as the bishop instructs him); if a married woman could not refute an accusation of adultery, "bisceop þonne wealde ⁊ stiðlice deme" (the bishop shall have control and judge severely); and if a person failed to clear himself of a morð charge, "deme se bisceop" (the bishop shall judge). 93 These final two offenses were normally subject to secular penalties, but the failure to prove innocence-presumably through the oath or ordeal, procedures that invoked God's judgment and were overseen by clergy-made the offense a spiritual matter, which placed a perpetrator, under royal law, within the bishop's jurisdiction. 94 89 II Cnut 58.1-2 set these fines at three pounds for archbishops or aethelings, and two pounds for bishops or ealdormen. 90 For perjury, see II Cnut 36; for binding or beating the clergy, see II Cnut 42; for ecclesiastical dues, see VIII AEthelred 7-8 (5 I Cnut 8.2), I Cnut 9-10.1, and II Cnut 48.1. 91 Compare Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1:56-57. 92 II Cnut 43 and VIII AEthelred 27 (5 I Cnut 5.3, omit "fullice"). 93 II Cnut 54.1 (the preceding clause 54 on adultery requires compensation "wið God ⁊ wið men," and this may be implicit in 54.1 as well); II Cnut 53.1; II Cnut 56.1. The precise meaning of morð is debated: 94 The secular consequences for each offense are listed in the preceding clauses: II Cnut 53 decrees that a woman whose adultery becomes known ("open weorðe") will forfeit her property and lose her nose and ears; II Cnut 56 requires a man responsible for a killing that is deemed murder ("open morð weorð") to be surrendered to his victim's family. Procedures for addressing charges through the oath or ordeal are provided in I AEthelred 1-1.14 and II Cnut 30-30.9. The ecclesiastical setting of the ordeal and invocations to God in judicial oaths are attested in Ordal and Swerian: see Liebermann, Gesetze, 1:386-87, 396-99; the bishop's role is explicated in Episcopus 5. In Wulfstan's legislation, material compensation or judgment was assigned to the bishop in cases that diminished the church's material well-being (refusal to pay tithes, harm to the clergy) or its integrity as an earthly institution (clerical crime, violation of episcopal protection, violation of marriage vows, testing God's judgment). These categories of offense would come to be regulated by ecclesiastical courts in the later medieval period, but in the early eleventh century, I contend, they were governed by royal law because of their status as material violations against the earthly church. 95 Nevertheless, Wulfstan is clear in De medicamento animarum that such "ecclesiastical" cases be overseen exclusively by bishops, just like the "canonical" suits that dealt with moral offenses. The implications of this mandate are thorny. It is conceivable that in "ecclesiastical" cases concerned with material violations against the earthly church, bishops would be responsible for trying or judging individuals who had broken secular law. This may be precisely the type of activity that AElfric cautioned against in his discussions of clerical participation in secular justice. Wulfstan presents the judicial defense of the earthly church as a vital episcopal obligation, yet it is likely that "ecclesiastical" cases functioned-and appeared to outside observers-much like secular ones did.
Ecclesiastical and Secular Collaboration
The overlap between religious and secular cases is reinforced in De medicamento animarum by the frequent use of judicial terminology. The text is concerned with those who issue judgments (iudiciis), debate and argue pleas (disputare), and are involved in lawsuits (causis, negotiis). Such legalistic vocabulary is rare in Wulfstan's writings, but here it is not appropriated directly from any Latin source. Rather, De medicamento animarum draws from canons dispersed across different collections, adapting a small selection of material concerned with judgments and the role of bishops; much of the legal language appears to be Wulfstan's own addition. 96 In some cases, he significantly alters the context of his sources to encompass judicial matters. When instructing clergymen to avoid earthly engagements, for instance, Wulfstan omits the original canon's exhortation to concentrate on pastoral duties and not domestic affairs; instead, he adds a prohibition against episcopal participation in secular justice. 97 Elsewhere, he expands upon a canon excluding bishops 95 Morris, "William I and the Church Courts," 460-61; Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1:110 and 139-44. See also Cubitt's suggestion that disputes concerning ecclesiastical property were subject to secular rather than ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the ninth century: "Bishops and Councils," 152. 96 The compiled nature of Cotton Nero A.i is discussed by Loyn, A Wulfstan Manuscript, esp. 46-53; Cross and Hamer, Wulfstan's Canon Law, 23-30. Some of this judicial language may have been adopted from the Collectio canonum Hibernensis, which employs legalistic vocabulary in a section titled "De judicio": the text is edited by Hermann Wasserschleben, Die irische Kanonensammlung (Leipzig, 1885), with this section (book 21) at 62-73. For the Collectio Hibernensis as a source for Wulfstanian texts, see Cross and Hamer, Wulfstan's Canon Law, 33-34; Elliot, "Canon Law Collections," 146-47. For its broader influence in tenth-and eleventh-century England, see Shannon Ambrose, "The Collectio canonum Hibernensis and the Literature of the Anglo-Saxon Benedictine Reform," Viator 36 (2005): 107-18. below. 97 This passage of De medicamento animarum (quoted above, p. 15) is expanded from a clause in the Collectio canonum Hibernensis; the same clause was also adapted in Wulfstan's canon law collec-from secular judicial deliberation, changing its meaning to forbid laymen from participating in canonical or ecclesiastical suits. 98 Through such revisions-which still bore the canonical authority of their sources-Wulfstan engaged the vocabulary of secular justice in order to delineate exclusive jurisdictions for lay and religious authorities. 99 While secular and ecclesiastical suits might employ similar procedures and draw on a common legal terminology, according to his formulation, they were to be clearly distinguished by their subject matter and personnel. 100 Why, then, did Wulfstan emphasize collaborative justice so heavily in his laws? If there needed to be a firm separation of secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, what was the benefit of the unified assemblies he advocated in VIII AEthelred and II Cnut? I propose that for Wulfstan, collaboration was most valuable when it came time to sentence offenders and enforce their punishments. While he forbade secular authorities to issue ecclesiastical judgments or assign penance, Wulfstan did expect the clergy to participate in sentencing in secular cases. In his tract Episcopus, for instance, he instructs, "Sculon bisceopas mid worulddeman domas dihtan, þaet hi ne geþafian, gyf his waldan magan, þaet ðaer aenig unriht up aspringe" (Bishops must establish sentences with secular judges, so that they do not allow any injustice to spring up, if it is within their power). 101 Likewise, in Cnut 1020, secular reeves are enjoined to "aeghwaer min folc rihtlice healdan ⁊ rihte domas deman be ðaera scira biscopa gewitnesse ⁊ swylce mildheortnesse þaeron don, swylce þaere scire biscope riht þince" (govern my people justly everywhere, and judge just sentences with the shire bishops' advice, and issue them with as much mercy as the shire bishop thinks just). 102 In these clauses, bishops are not told to argue cases or issue decisions in secular suits; rather, they are required to consult with lay authorities to establish appropriate sentences. 103 A driving principle of Wulfstan's legislation was the need for merciful penalties, which punished an offender's earthly violation yet did not hinder his eventual salvation. Wulfstan departed from earlier Anglo-Saxon law by issuing predominently nonlethal (friðlice) sentences that enabled offenders to live and repent of their sins, but even when death sentences were unavoidable, he demonstrated concern for the souls of the condemned: he required that final confession be offered to convicts before their execution, and he moved away from decadesold laws that prohibited burying dead criminals in consecrated ground. 104 In this context, Wulfstan's call for collaborative sentencing offers a further opportunity to ensure spiritual health-not only for the offender, but for the judge who might endanger his own soul through an overly harsh penalty. 105 The bishop's job in secular sentencing was to temper earthly punishments and bring them in line with Christian priorities.
In religious cases, by contrast, Wulfstan was concerned with collaboration in enforcement, rather than in sentencing. His main focus in De medicamento animarum is penance, the medicine of souls for which the tract is titled. The obligations of the clergy are clear: "Confitentibus quoque ac penitentibus omnimodo sucurrant: et indifferenter penitentię leges petentibus [sic] iniungant" (They should help those who confess, and also penitents, in every way, and objectively impose upon penitents the laws of penance). 106 Wulfstan then describes the range of appropriate penances for sinners. These include devotional activities, like prayers and vigils, but there are also options that affect the penitent materially and physically, including almsgiving, fast-ing, and "diuersis corporum castigationibus" (various bodily castigations). 107 Although the list is followed by the assertion that "episcoporum enim est omnia iudicia ęclęsiastica rite disponere" (it is right that bishops set all ecclesiastical judgments), 108 the discussion of penances-like other sections of this tract-is marked by legal and judicial rhetoric that would be appropriate in a secular context. Bishops must impose the laws (leges iniungant) of penance without bias (indifferenter), following correct (rite) procedure when they set judgments (iudicia disponere). This terminology mirrors the language applied to earthly justice elsewhere in the text, thus creating a shared vocabulary for secular and penitential sentencing. In addition, this diction reinforces the fact that penance was a penalty to be administered from above, by a higher earthly authority, just like punishments for mundane offenses. Accordingly, penitential sentences needed as much enforcement as secular ones. Wulfstan explains, "Quoniam sunt nonnulli qui paruipendunt diuinam doctrinam: ideo oportet eos per seculares potentię disciplinam . a tam praua consuetudine . cohercere et corrigere" (Because there are some who give little weight to divine instruction, it is therefore fitting for them to be coerced and corrected from such perverse custom through the discipline of secular power). 109 Wulfstan develops this point in another Latin text preserved as part of his "commonplace book," in a discussion of convicted sinners who persist in their misdeeds: "Necesse est ut inuiti pęnas pęnitentię exsoluant . ne animę pro quibus dominus passus est . in ęterna pęna dispereant. . . . Melius est enim cuique ut coactus ad regnum . quam sponte ad supplicium perueniat sempiternum" (It is necessary that they involuntarily pay the penalty of penance, lest the souls for which the Lord suffered perish in eternal punishment. . . . For it is better for anyone to come coerced to the king than voluntarily to eternal suffering). 110 In this formulation, it was collaboration with lay authoritiesin this case the king and, presumaby, royal representatives capable of forcing compliance-that gave religious sentences their weight and ensured that penances would be completed. This may have been a particularly pressing issue when "bodily castigations" were prescribed, but Wulfstan was also concerned that lesser penances could too easily be ignored. 111 In De medicamento animarum, he urges that secular pressure be applied to those "qui fingunt et dicunt . se habere humilitatem in christo: sed despiciunt obedientiam mandatorum eius . spernuntque predicatores salutis: et propterea mentiuntur . quia non sunt humiles: sed superbi" (who pretend and say that they have humility in Christ but despise obedience to his commands and spurn salvific warnings. And they lie about these things because they are not humble but proud). 112 This critique seems especially applicable to individuals who were assigned less conspicuous acts of penance, such as prayer or almsgiving; the absence of bodily mortification, by comparison, might be considerably more difficult to conceal. If Wulfstan's objective was full adherence to Christian law, then even small violations, like evading modest penances, could damage the overall health of the kingdom. The threat of retribution from lay authorities would presumably lead to greater compliance with spiritual directives, thereby securing divine approval. Moreover, reliable secular enforcement would give ecclesiastical justice greater legitimacy, confirming that spiritual atonement was on a par with secular punishments. Although the ignorant-those who "give little weight to divine instruction"-might be unable to see the connection beween individual piety and national prosperity, pressure from earthly magnates could secure their compliance. 113 Even if some individuals' understanding of the spiritual benefits was imperfect, or their obedience to the bishop's instructions was grudging, they would nevertheless be compelled to perform the penance their souls required in order to avoid further material punishment.
A final question to consider is who exactly would enact this policy of enforcement. Perhaps the most practical solution was to entrust this responsibility to people who normally enforced secular sentences: the king, local magnates, and their representatives. In De medicamento animarum, though, Wulfstan offered another solution: "episcopi curam animarum indesinenter habeant: et nequaquam seculares curas assumant: sed habeant sub se aduocatos . et prepositos: qui populares causas exerceant et sint semper parati ad resistendam rebellium pertinacium" (bishops should constantly have care of souls and by no means assume secular responsibilities; but they should have advocates and surrogates under them, who can enforce the people's suits and always be prepared for the resistance of stubborn rebels). 114 In other words, a bishop is not permitted to enforce judicial sentences himself, but he may employ and supervise underlings who can legitimately act on his behalf in the secular sphere. This is another instance where Wulfstan diverged from his sources. The original canons direct the first part of this rule to bishops, priests, and deacons alike, requiring deposition for any who should participate in secular affairs. 115 Wulfstan's adaptation omits all mention of deposition, addresses this instruction exclusively to bishops, and conceives an administrative hierarchy to represent episcopal interests. Given Wulfstan's formulation, it is not impossible that these surrogates would include lower orders of clergy; it is only bishops who are prohibited from "secular responsibilities." Yet this instruction could also be directed toward members of the laity, who might act on the bishop's behalf when direct episcopal participation was inappropriate. Such an arrangement is implicit in Wulfstan's legislation, in clauses delineating how tithes should be collected from unwilling individuals:
Gif hwa teoþunge rihtlice gelaestan nelle, þonne fare to þaes cyninges gerefa ⁊ þaes mynstres maessepreost-oððe þaes landrican ⁊ þaes biscopes gerefa-⁊ niman unþances ðone teoðan dael to ðam mynstre, þe hit to gebirige, ⁊ taecan him to ðam nigoðan dael; ⁊ todaele man ða eahta daelas on twa ⁊ fo se landhlaford to healfum, to healfum se biscop, si hit cyninges man, sy hit þegnes. 116 [If anyone does not wish to justly render his tithe, then let the king's reeve and the Mass priest of the minster go to him-or the landowner and the bishop's reeve-and let them take the tenth part to the minster without his consent, and assign to him the ninth part, and divide the eight remaining parts in two, and let the landlord take half and the bishop take half, whether the offender be the king's man or a thegn 's.] In this scenario, the overdue tithe and forfeited property would be collected by some combination of secular and ecclesiastical authorities, including the bishop's reevepresumably a layman entrusted with protecting episcopal property and overseeing the church's earthly affairs on the bishop's behalf. 117 These individuals seem exactly the type of "advocates and surrogates" Wulfstan envisioned in De medicamento animarum, empowered to compel "stubborn rebels" to submit to ecclesiastical rules. 118 Even if bishops were required to distance themselves from the administration of earthly justice and the implementation of material punishments, Wulfstan was clear that their interests needed to be robustly defended by episcopal delegates and secular allies.
Conclusions
Much of De medicamento animarum is compiled from materials that appear elsewhere in Wulfstan's "commonplace book," and there is considerable thematic overlap with his other writings. 119 Yet this text represents his clearest discussion of how the clergy-and especially bishops-ought to participate in judicial matters. Fundamentally, Wulfstan's approach was in line with AElfric's advice: clergy were not to litigate or issue judgments in secular cases because such activity ran counter to their pastoral mission. However, Wulfstan took a more nuanced view of the realities of earthly justice. Rather than requiring clergy to absent themselves in order to maintain their spiritual purity, as AElfric advocated, Wulfstan recognized a number of circumstances in which the clergy were obliged to participate in secular affairs in order to defend the interests of the earthly church. Such work should be understood as acts of devotion, according to his reasoning, for De medicamento animarum instructs bishops to administer their sees "uelut deo contemplante" (as if God were observing). 120 Moreover, where AElfric focused on keeping the clergy out of secular justice, Wulfstan was just as committed to keeping the laity out of church business. He cited the distance between orders (distantia est ordinum) to make this point, presumably drawing on AElfric's discourse on the three orders of society, which preceded the discussion of secular justice in his pastoral letter to Wulfstan. 121 For AElfric, these orders-those who work, fight, and pray-were separate: the clergy's role was "bellare uiriliter contra spiritalia nequitia" (to fight strongly against spiritual iniquity), and anyone who undertook secular obligations after ordination "erit apostata" (would be an apostate). 122 The logic of De medicamento animarum is driven by principles of ecclesiastical autonomy, more than by religious purity, but the differentiation of ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions that Wulfstan envisioned was consistent with AElfric's model.
Wulfstan diverges from AElfric, however, in his views concerning the appropriate relationship between orders. AElfric acknowledges interdependence between the three orders-if one fails, the others cannot endure-but firmly delineates each sphere from the others, construing their obligations as mutually exclusive. 123 Wulfstan echoes the language of interdependence in his own discussion of the three orders in his Institutes of Polity, and like AElfric, he situates this discourse immediately before remarks about earthly justice. 124 The kingdom will thrive, according to Wulfstan, if the orders are strengthened mid wislicre Godes lare, and mid rihtlicre woruldlage: þaet wyrð þam þeodscype to langsuman raede. And soð is, þaet ic secge: awacie se cristendom, sona scylfð se cynedom; and araere man unlaga ahwar on lande oððe unsida lufige ahwar to swiðe, þaet cymð þaere þeode eall to unþearfe. Ac do man, swa hit þearf is, alecge man unriht and raere up Godes riht.
[with God's wise teachings and with just earthly law; that will guide the nation for a long time. And it is true what I say: if Christianity weakens, the kingdom will quickly be shaken; and if anyone raise up injustice anywhere in the land or love bad customs too much, then the nation will all come to harm. But let what is necessary be done: let injustice be set aside and God's justice be raised up. 125 ] Ordering society correctly-that is, in accordance with God's will-requires good earthly law, enforced through the righteous exercise of justice; the juxtaposition of this point with an explication of the three orders in both authors' writings confirms how integrally these ideas were connected. Still, Wulfstan did not adopt AElfric's ideas about exclusivity. 126 Instead, he depicted the cultivation of piety and justice as a shared responsibily in De medicamento animarum, despite the distance (distantia) that otherwise separated the orders. This difference of opinion may be attributed to the environments in which these authors were working. Writing in a monastic context, AElfric apparently viewed the issue of clerical participation in the secular world in black-and-white terms, whereas Wulfstan's own episcopal responsibilities required him to grapple with a sizable grey area. As the archbishop's discussions of earthly justice reveal, there was rarely a sharp divide between secular and ecclesiastical interests. Wulfstan decreed that mundane offenses be compensated for Gode ⁊ for worolde, with penances imposed alongside material penalties to redeem the moral failings that inspired misbehavior. Accordingly, if all crimes were rooted in sin, violations of royal law must also be a religious matter. By this logic, most occasions for earthly justice would have required some degree of clerical intervention. Although it was inappropriate for a bishop to litigate or decide a secular suit that had no direct bearing on ecclesiastical matters, it was necessary that he intervene with lay authorities to save the souls involved. Likewise, while the clergy were supposed to avoid secular business whenever possible, they were obliged to defend the rights, property, and integrity of the earthly church. I suggest that Wulfstan regarded such action as an extension of pastoral duties: in addition to saving individual souls, it was incumbent upon the clergy to ensure that the church had sufficient protection and resources to fulfill its mission. While such efforts might be mistaken for secular activity by an outside observer like AElfric, Wulfstan recognized the complexity of earthly justice and delineated an acceptable role for the clergy within established legal processes.
To conclude this discussion, I would like to return to the idea of dual penaltiesthe earthly punishments "common to Christ and the king," whose decline Wulfstan lamented in VIII AEthelred 38. 127 This phrase suggests some degree of overlap between penitential and material compensation, but it is unclear how fully these categories converged: could a single penalty serve simultaneously as punishment and penance? Even though his royal laws never prescribe specific penances, Wulfstan seems to have imagined that such a scenario was possible in cases of violation against the church. In VI AEthelred 51, he provided a list of appropriate uses for funds acquired by ecclesiastical authorities in cases where "for godbotan feohbot ariseð, swa swa wise woroldwitan to steora gesettan" (money compensation is rendered as penance, as wise earthly counselors established as punishment): such revenue was to be used only to maintain the church and further its mission, "naefre to woroldlican idelan gelengan, ac for woroldsteoran to godcundan neodan" (never to advance worldly vanity, but for a secular punishment to advance spiritual needs). 128 Earthly punishment and religious penance are both satisfied with a common penalty, in this formulation. 129 A similar conflation is evident in clauses that call for payments to the bishop for violations against the earthly church. For instance, I Cnut 9 and 10 require monetary fines to the bishop if religious dues are not paid promptly; II Cnut 42 requires "altar compensation" (weofodbote) to be rendered to the bishop by anyone who abuses a clergyman; and II Cnut 58 requires monetary payment to the bishop for violations of his protection. It is never stated whether such penalties were meant to compensate material harm or spiritual corruption, but when read alongside the instructions in VI AEthelred 51, it is possible that they were intended to do both. 130 Nevertheless, while the payment of certain secular fines may have been understood to provide a spiritual benefit, it is improbable that such payments fulfilled all the penitential obligations required by Wulfstan's laws. In some circumstances, there may have been an expectation that penance would be rendered in a separate process, distinct from the payment of fines prescribed in royal legislation. 131 It could be that the law codes' side-by-side instructions for punishment and penance were intended for emphasis, in instances of grave malfeasance in both the secular and spiritual spheres (committing homicide in a church, for example). For lesser offenses, by contrast, the penalties mandated by royal law may have created opportunites for additional penitential sentences to be issued. Perhaps offenders were expected to render ecclesiastical fines during the judicial assemblies at which their cases were heard, with the bishop empowered to prounounce a separate penitential sentence as he accepted payment. Or perhaps offenders were instructed to deliver their fines at a later date to a church, where they would be required to undertake confession and penance in order to complete the process of compensation. 132 I have argued elsewhere that the severe corporal punishments prescribed in Wulfstan's royal law codes had a penitential objective, causing offenders enough suffering to inspire them to reconcile with God before death. 133 I propose here that milder secular penalties, such as fines, served a comparable function: material punishment created an opportunity for the offender to redeem his sins with the church and settle with God through an act of penance, whether or not the payment itself fulfilled this purpose.
Although Wulfstan did not conflate crime and sin in his laws, he did envision a close connection between these categories. According to his legal philosophy, crime was a symptom of more serious spiritual corruption; thus, the ultimate goal of secular punishment was to redeem offenders' sin, even as it kept peace and order in the secular sphere. Because judges were responsible for issuing sentences that were "for Gode sy gebeorhlic ⁊ for worulde aberendlic" (justifiable before God and bearable before the world), it was vital that the clergy be involved in earthly justice, to ensure that spiritual concerns would be addressed correctly. 134 Although boundaries between secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions helped preserve the purity and focus of the clergy, those boundaries needed to be permeable when it came time to assign and implement penalties, moments at which Christian souls were particularly vulnerable. By having laymen and bishops dispense justice at a common gathering, spiritual and material penalties could be imposed together, backed by the full legal power of secular and ecclesiastical authorities. Participation in trials and deliberations, by contrast, was to be limited to the appropriate personnel, depending on the nature of the case. This approach did not efface the distinction between moral and material offenses. Neither did it legitimize broad clerical participation in secular procedure. Wulfstan's innovation, I propose, was to redefine ecclesiastical involvement in earthly justice as an element of pastoral care. 135 It was the responsibility of the clergy-especially bishops-to ensure that no souls were lost through overly permissive royal law, inordinately harmful punishments, or unfulfilled penitential sentences. It was also crucial, however, that the clergy keep to their appointed place and not be distracted by secular affairs that did not further their pastoral mission: bishops should not "secularibus iudiciis . aut negotiis: curis . uel causis . se . . . ocupent sed eclesiasticis" (to occupy themselves with administration or pleas in secular judgments or lawsuits-only with ecclesiastical ones). 136 In delineating precise roles for lay and clerical magnates, and in establishing the limits of secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, Wulfstan's approach to earthly justice was largely consistent with the stated logic behind the separation of jurisdictions after the Norman Conquest. Like William, Wulfstan sought to institute a judicial structure that would give clergy exclusive authority over Christian souls and insulate the church from secular concerns. This also seems to have been an objective behind AEthelred's pre-Wulfstanian law codes, which removed religious provisions altogether, presumably with the understanding that cases that touched on church affairs or spiritual offenses would be governed by ecclesiastical, not secular, procedure. It is significant, however, that the competing judicial models that emerged in the generation after Edgar's death were each concerned with a detrimental overlap between ecclesiastical and secular justice. The point of contention was how such overlap should be addressed. Where AEthelred's pre-Wulfstanian laws appear to have moved away from Edgar's collaborative model by fully separating ecclesiastical and secular justice, Wulfstan sought to improve upon Edgar's laws by delineating precise jurisdictions for clergy and laymen within a collaborative system.
The problem with Wulfstan's model, I suggest, was that the divisions he outlined were too subtle to be practicable on a wide scale. However sound the theory behind his differentiation of ecclesiastical and secular judicial obligations, it seems unlikely that lay and religious magnates would keep strictly or consistently to their assigned roles at mixed assemblies. Yet even if the boundaries were respected in some cases, these limitations would not necessarily be apparent to outsiders. The precise roles filled by secular and ecclesiastical authorities could be obscured by collaborative deliberation, leading observers-from AElfric to William-to conclude that there was no substantive difference between these groups or their influence. Moreover, although William's mandate for separate jurisdictions suggests that collaborative justice endured through the Conquest, it is unclear how fully this model adhered to Wulfstan's prescriptions. Judicial privileges were granted to religious authorities with increasing frequency as the eleventh century progressed, indicating that bishops and other high-ranking clergymen had a material stake in the administration of earthly justice. 137 While it is conceivable that ecclesiastics delegated their judicial activities to lay administrators, as Wulfstan advocated, it seems probable (in light of post-Conquest concerns) that at least some members of the clergy were participating in a full range of secular judicial processes. William deemed this approach untenable, and it is tempting to read his initiatives as first steps toward later medieval jurisprudence-especially when viewed in light of twelfth-century conflicts over the jurisdictions of canonical and secular courts in England, or the sharpening division
